Wills and Trusts by Galvin, Charles O.
SMU Law Review
Volume 29




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation







Collateral Attack. In Wycough v. Bennett1 Irvine and Bertha were mar-
ried and had no children. Billy was the son of Irvine by a prior marriage,
and James was the son of Bertha by a prior marriage. Irvine and Bertha
acquired certain realty in Dallas County as community property. In May
1960 Irvine subscribed to a document purporting to be his last will in which
he left all his property to Bertha. The document was improperly witnessed.
Irvine died in 1964, and the purported will was not offered for probate within
four years after his death. 2 Meanwhile, Bertha remarried and in 1969 con-
veyed the realty to her son, James. In the same 'year James filed Irvine's
will for probate as a muniment of title.3 The probate court ordered the will
admitted to probate and this judgment was not appealed. James then recon-
veyed the property to his mother. She thereafter died intestate, leaving only
James as her heir-at-law.
Billy brought suit in the district court against James to partition the prop-
erty and collaterally attacked the judgment of the probate court by contend-
ing that his father's will was a nullity. The trial court sustained James' mo-
tion for summary judgment, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The
district court held that the probate court had jurisdiction over the instrument
offered for probate. Collateral attack is available as a remedy only when
the court entering judgment has no jurisdiction. 4  Thus, since the probate
court had jurisdiction to admit the will to probate the only remedy available
in this case was direct appeal of that order.
Bill of Review. Sibert v. Devlin5 involved the question of a bill of review
to set aside a partition among heirs. James and Rosie McDowell were hus-
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity.
1. 510 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Stevens v. Douglass, 505 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1974), holding that an order of the probate
court constituted a final and appealable judgment.
2. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 73, 74 (Supp. 1974) provide that under normal cir-
cumstances a will must be offered for probate within four years after the death of the
testator.
3. A will may be probated after the expiration of four years from the date of death
as a necessary link in a chain of title of property which passed under the will, so long
as the party presenting the will as a muniment of title was not in default in presenting
the will for probate before the expiration of the statutory period. See Fortinberry v.
Fortinberry, 326 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. Recently, in Deen v. Kirk, 508 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1974), the Texas Supreme
Court has held that a collateral attack on a final judgment was improper where the court
rendering judgment had jurisdiction to do so. See also Hodges, Collateral Attacks on
Judgments, 41 T~xAs L. REV. 499, 505 (1963).
5. 508 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
band and wife and had five children. They had acquired 148 acres of land
as community property. James died intestate in 1918 and the five children
acquired his half interest by descent and distribution, but the property was
not divided. Rosie died in 1963 leaving a holographic will in which she pro-
vided that each of her five children would receive thirty acres, with two
daughters to receive certain improved portions as their shares. The two daugh-
ters, Ola and Annie, filed their mother's will for probate in the county
court and were appointed independent executrices on September 30, 1963.
Two other children, Lanora and Aubie, filed a contest to the will in the
county court. The county court denied the contest and ordered an equal di-
vision of the land into five parts with Ola and Annie to have the improve-
ments on their portions. Lanora and Aubie gave notice of appeal from the
judgment ordering partition but did not perfect the appeal. The commis-
sioners appointed to make the partition divided the land into approximately
five equal parts and awarded to Ola and Annie the improved parcels. La-
nora and Aubie objected to the commissioner's report; they were overruled
and perfected an appeal from the order approving the report to the district
court.
Lanora and Aubie also commenced a new suit in the district court seeking
to partition the acreage, contending, among other things, that the county
court had no jurisdiction over the acreage which the five children had in-
herited from their father in 1918. This suit resulted in a new partition in
unequal shares. Because of the illness of their attorney and a resulting mis-
take or accident, Ola and Annie and their brother Ruel failed to perfect an
appeal from this judgment. Subsequently they filed a bill of review attacking
the district court judgment and the bill of review was denied. The court of
civil appeals reversed and granted the relief sought by the bill of review.
Section 386 of the Texas Probate Code 6 authorizes an action of partition
in the county court if a person has a joint interest with the estate of a de-
cedent. The county court ordered such a partition from which no appeal
was perfected. The appeal from the order approving the commissioner's par-
tition on an equal basis entitled the district court to consider only issues
touching on the approval of the commissioner's report. The district court,
therefore, had no authority to repartition the land.
Equitable Conversion. In Lamprnan v. Sledge7 plaintiff obtained a judg-
ment against Lowe in 1970, which was recorded in the Abstract of Judgment
records on February 24, 1971. Coatney was a feme sole who on February
12, 1971, entered into a contract of sale with Sledge covering a certain lot.
However, this contract was not to become effective unless and until Sledge
obtained adequate financing. On February 22, 1971, before the contract of
sale was closed, Coatney died, leaving a will dated February 6, 1971, in
which she devised one-fourth of her estate to Lowe. The will directed the
6. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 386 (1956) provides in part: "Any person having
a joint interest with the estate of a decedent in any property, real or personal, may make
application to the court from which letters testamentary . . . have been granted thereon
to have a partition thereof . .. .
7. 502 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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executor "to reduce all properties to cash before any distribution." The
executor delivered to Sledge a deed to the lot, but Lampman contended that
Lowe owned a one-fourth interest in the lot under Coatney's will, and that
Lampman's judgment lien applied to the interest in the lot.
The court held that the contract, which was subject to a condition prece-
dent that the purchaser obtain adequate financing, did not work an equitable
conversion when executed. Nevertheless, the court held for Sledge upon the
rationale that the will directed a reduction of all properties to cash so that
the lot in question was equitably converted into cash and was not an interest
in realty devised to Lowe to which the lien could attach.
Claims. Collins v. States involved the question of the proper filing of a
claim against the estate of a decedent. Two state hospitals filed for reim-
bursement of costs for the support and maintenance of the deceased. As
to issues presented in the case, the court held, among other things, (1) that
the Texas Tuberculosis Code9 section 9(2)(b) authorized such a suit, (2)
that state's counsel properly represented the interests of the hospitals, (3)
that the certificate of the head of the hospital'was sufficient evidence of the
amount due and there was no requirement of a sworn account, (4) that the
costs were not shown to be other than the actual costs to the state, and (5)
that in the case of an independent administration suit may be commenced
against the estate more than ninety days after the claim is rejected. 10
In another case involving claims the court enunciated the rule that in the
case of a power of sale in a deed of trust, a sale under such power after
the mortgagor's death may be set aside by an administrator if administra-
tion is opened within four years of the mortgagor's death."
Timeliness of Probate. In Brown v. Byrd' 2 Elizabeth died in May 1940,
survived by three children. In April 1944 her holographic will and first codi-
cil were discovered, but were not offered for probate until December 5, 1973.
The question involved the application of Probate Code section 73(a) which
provides that a will may not be admitted to probate after the lapse of four
years from the death of the testator unless the party applying was not in de-
fault. In the instant case the proponent claimed that she learned of the will
just prior to the expiration of four years after the death of the testatrix but
she was then in California. She returned to Lufkin, Texas, in 1946 and re-
mained until 1956. In addition, the proponent contended that she relied
on a verbal family agreement, that she was not well educated and relied on
a non-lawyer officer of the bank to do whatever was necessary, and that she
was ignorant of what probate proceedings were. The county court admitted
8. 506 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
9. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-11 (1966).
10. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (1956) provides that when a claim has been re-jected, the claimant must institute suit within 90 days after such rejection or the claim
is barred. The supreme court has held, however, that this provision is not applicable
to claims in an independent administration. See Bunting v. Pearson, 430 S.W.2d 470
(Tex. 1968).
11. Delley v. Unknown Stockholders of the Brotherly & Sisterly Club of Christ, Inc.,
509 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Pearce v.
Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).
12. 512 S.W.2d 753, 512 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
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the will to probate, but the court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the
proponent's reasons were not of such substance as to excuse her delay in
filing the will thirty-three years after the death of the testatrix.
Lost Will. Mingo v. Mingo13 concerned an unproduced written will. In
1953 an attorney prepared a will for the testatrix and retained in his office
a conformed copy of the original. The testatrix died in 1972 and the original
could not be found. It was last seen in the custody of the testatrix seven
or eight years before her death. Accordingly, the proponent had the burden
of rebutting the presumption of revocation. 14 Although there was consider-
able testimony about the decedent and her family, there was no testimony
that shed any light on the issue of revocation. Thus, the proponent failed
to overcome the presumption.
Defective Pleadings-Testamentary Capacity Issue. In Melady v. Coul-
ter15 a will was admitted to probate in the county court and the contestants
appealed. In the district court the jury answered two special issues finding
first, that the testatrix did not possess testamentary capacity, and second, that
she was induced to make the will because of undue influence of her surviving
husband. The district court denied probate, and the proponents appealed.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded. The court held that the
testamentary capacity issue had not been raised in the county court and it
was not permissible to raise the issue in the district court.' 6
Turning to the merits and more specifically the issue of undue influence,
the court found that the testatrix had executed the will three days before her
death from cancer. Her husband had made physical assaults on her over
a period of years prior to her death, and there were four divorce suits filed
in which they were parties, two of which went to final judgment. However,
they were remarried at the time of her death. The husband discouraged
visits by the relatives of his wife, and the lawyer who prepared the will repre-
sented the husband in one or more of his divorce actions. His wife had told
the nurse she did not want to sign the will but she would do so.
Despite all these facts the court of civil appeals found no direct threats
of coercion at the time the will was signed and described the evidence as
so circumstantial as to arouse little more than speculation and suspicion.
Foreign Will-Dead Man's Statute. In Holt v. Drake1 7 the executor of
the decedent's estate filed the decedent's will in New Hampshire, contending
that the decedent was a resident of that state. The will was offered in Texas
13. 507 S.W.2d 3,10 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. The generally recognized rule is that where a will was in the possession of the
testator or when he had ready access to it when last seen, failure to produce the will
after his death raises the presumption the testator destroyed it with the intention to re-
voke it, and the burden to prove to the contrary is on the proponent. See Bailey v.
Bailey, 171 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943, no writ); accord, McEl-
roy v. Phink, 97 Tex. 147, 76 S.W. 753, motion for rehearing denied, 77 S.W. 1025
(1903); Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Rushing, 433 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1968, no writ).
15. 504 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
16. For additional support for this proposition see Harkey v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 146 Tex. 504, 208 S.W.2d 919 (1948); Morton v. Humber, 399 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, no writ).
17. 505 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
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for probate as a foreign will. The executor testified as to conversations he
had with the deceased, and the ancillary administratrix objected under the
Dead Man's Statute.18  The trial court overruled the objection. The court
of civil appeals reversed on the grounds that the testimony of the executor
was prohibited under the statute and the objection should have been sus-
tained.
Conflict of Interest-Coexecutors. In 7-Up Bottling Co. v. Capital
National Bank 9 the bank and one Kuempel were independent coexecutors
of the estate of Knebel, a stockholder in the bottling company. Kuempel
was also an officer, director, and shareholder of the corporation. Pursuant
to an agreement with the deceased the bottling company sought to purchase
the stock of the deceased and a value was determined by the bank's trust
department.
Among other things the sale under the agreement was voided under Texas
Probate Code section 352. Because Kuempel was acting as coexecutor of
the estate and also as principal stockholder of the bottling company, the stat-
ute specifically proscribes such a transaction, however much in good faith
it may be.20
Election. During the period under review the case of Turcotte v. Tre-
vino 21 was decided by the court of civil appeals at Corpus Christi. This is
one of numerous cases arising out of the contest of the highly publicized will
of Sarita K. East. Mrs. East died in 1971, a resident of Nueces County,
possessed of an estate valued at twenty-nine million dollars. Mrs. East had
no children, and there were numerous parties who claimed an interest in her
estate under either of two wills and codicils thereto: a 1948 will and a 1960
will. Seven separate appeals were perfected out of the extensive litigation.
This particular case turned on the question of whether or not Edgar Turcotte,
a first cousin, who was appointed executor under the 1960 will had accepted
such benefits under the will so as to estop him from contesting the 1960 will.
The court of civil appeals remanded with directions. The fact that he re-
ceived an executor's fee and salary was a proper cost of administration and
not a benefit. Moreover, the court held that Turcotte did not have sufficient
knowledge of all his rights so as to have made a conscious election of bene-
fits.
Venue. In Deason v. Rogers22 plaintiffs filed suit in the district court in
Aransas County against William Deason who was independent executor and
18. TEX. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (1926). It is now clearly settled that the
Dead Man's Statute is applicable in actions to probate wills. See, e.g., Thomason v.
Burch, 223 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. 505 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See compan-
ion case, Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 505 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974,
writ granted).
20. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 352 (1956) provides:
The personal representative of an estate shall not become the purchaser,
directly or indirectly, of any property of the estate sold by him, or by any
co-representative if one be acting. If any such purchase is made, any per-
son interested in the estate may file a written complaint with the court
[and] . . . such sale shall be by the court declared void, and shall be set
aside by the court and the property ordered to be reconveyed to the estate.
21. 499 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. 499 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd).
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sole beneficiary under the will of B.F. Deason. Aransas County was the
county in which the estate was administered. William Deason filed a plea
of privilege to be sued in San Patricio County, the county of his residence.
Article 1995(6) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides that a suit
against an executor may be brought in the county in which such estate is
administered. However, in this case Deason was sued in his individual ca-
pacity so that subdivision 6 was inapplicable. Nevertheless, subsection 11
was held to substantiate venue in Aransas County because it provides that
if the "defendant has inherited an estate concerning which the suit is com-
menced, suit may be brought in the county where such estate principally
lies." The court construed "inherited" as meaning an estate taken under a
will23 so that the venue under the statute was properly in Aransas County.
Indispensable Parties. Crickmer v. King24 was a suit for declaratory judg-
ment to construe the joint and mutual wills of a husband and wife who left
their properties to each other and further provided that should they die
"simultaneously, or approximately so" their property would vest in "the chil-
dren of either of us." If the deaths were not simultaneous or approximately
so, the properties were left undisposed of, and would vest by the laws of
descent and distribution. The wife died on January 28, 1973, and the hus-
band died of unrelated causes on February 4, 1973. The independent exec-
utor of -the joint will filed a suit seeking a construction of the "simultaneous
death" provision to determine if the deaths came within that provision. Cita-
tions were not issued nor served on the children listed in the will nor on the
heirs of the husband, who was the last to die. The court of civil appeals
held that all these people were indispensable parties to the declaratory judg-
ment action and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for a new trial.25 It
should be noted that the court based its holding primarily upon the language
of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act 26 which provides in section 11 that
all parties who have or claim an interest which would be affected by the
declaration shall be made parties. This type of statutory language has been
held to have a mandatory connotation,27 and thus the act seems clearly to
indicate that parties possessing property interests affected by the will must
be joined as parties to an action seeking a construction of the provisions of
the will. Were there no such statutory mandate the joinder of additional par-
ties would be left to the discretion of the trial judge pursuant to rule 39 of
23. Pacheco v. Fernandez, 277 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, writ
ref'd).
24. 507 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
25. In its holding the court adhered to the general rule that all parties whose interest
in the property will be affected by the will are indispensable parties to an action to con-
strue the will. See Schoenhals v. Schoenhals, 366 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ama-
rillo 1963, no writ). This rule has been applied in Texas to devisees and legatees named
in the will, see Kelsey v. Hill, 433 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no
writ), and to heirs at law in other jurisdictions, see City Trust Co. v. Bulkley, 151 Conn.
598, 201 A.2d 196 ('19,64); City of St. Louis v. McAllister, 302 Mo. 152, 257 S.W. 425
(1923). Thus, since this case requires heirs at law to be brought in as indispensable
parties it seems to harmonize Texas law with that which has been long established in
other jurisdictions.
26. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, § 11 (1965).
27. State Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 158 Tex. 612, 315 S.W.2d 279 (1958).
[Vol. 29
WILLS AND TRUSTS
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it has been recently empha-
sized by the supreme court that when a rule of the court conflicts with a legis-
lative enactment, the rule must yield.28
What Constitutes a Valid Will. The cases continue to demonstrate how
carefully the requirements of the statutes must be complied with. In In re Es-
tate of Brown29 the testatrix executed a formal and witnessed will in 1965.
Following her death in 1970 this will was duly probated without contest.
Thereafter one Josephine Benton filed application for probate of a written
instrument as a codicil which was allegedly executed after the will of 1965.30
The writing was a cryptic note entirely in the handwriting of the decedent
and written on an envelope in which there was a certificate of deposit. Ex-
trinsic evidence was admitted to explain the testatrix's intention with respect
to the certificate. The court sustained the writing as a valid holographic
codicil, and this holding was affirmed on appeal.
Cherry v. Reed31 involved a writing of two pages which contained a self-
proving affidavit in conformity with section 59 of the Texas Probate Code.
This affidavit was properly completed, but the will itself had no signatures
or blanks for signatures for the testatrix and the witnesses. The document
was denied probate as failing to comply with the requirements for a valid
will. The reasoning which supports this strict application of the statutory
requirements for execution is that a testamentary document must first be a
valid will before the self-proving clause has any effect.3 2 Conversely, a self-
proving affidavit is not an instrument executed with testamentary intent and
thus even though it is properly executed it can lend no validity to an other-
wise improperly executed will.
Construction. City of Austin v. Austin National Bank3 3 concerned a holo-
graphic will which provided in part that all of the income from the remainder
of the decedent's estate was to go to the Humane Society. Elsewhere in the
will the testatrix provided that she wanted the Austin National ,Bank to ad-
minister her estate. The supreme court held the trust insufficient because
"the will does not manifest a clear intent to separate the income from the
corpus nor to create a trust."'34 On another issue the court affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower courts that a gift of land to the city of Austin "as a park
to be used for no other purpose-not to be used by any other organization-
otherwise it shall be given to . . .Humane Society . . ." was a gift of land
on condition subsequent.
In Morris v. Pickett35 paragraph 8 of the testatrix's will provided that stock
dividends or division of shares should go to her residuary estate except as
28. Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971); accord, Mis-
souri, K. & T. Ry. v. Beasley, 106 Tex. .160, 155 S.W. 183 (1913).
29. 507 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
30. Under TEX. 'PROB. CODE ANN. § 63 (1956) a subsequent will or codicil revokes
all previous wills.
31. 512 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
accord, In re Estate of Pettengill, 508 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
32. Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. 1966).
33. 503 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1973).
34. Id. at 760.
35. 503 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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otherwise provided. In paragraph 11 she provided that stock splits and stock
dividends belonged to the beneficiary to whom the original shares were given.
The court determined that these provisions were effective to pass to the bene-
ficiaries of the original stock a stock split approved before the testatrix exe-
cuted her will but distributed after such execution and before the testatrix's
death.
In Bryan v. Melvin"6 under the wills and codicils of George Adams and
Mary Adams the residue of their estates was left to their three children and
a granddaughter, Ann, the only child of a deceased son, Barton. The instru-
ments provided that amounts owing the testators "as evidenced by notes or
written obligations" were forgiven. During his lifetime George Adams ad-
vanced various sums of money to his children and kept open account books
reflecting these amounts. Barton, the deceased son, owed his father $73,000,
of which $50,000 was evidenced by a note. Ann, Barton's only child and
sole heir, had no obligation to her grandparents, George and Mary. The ad-
ministrator of the estates of George and Mary Adams contended that the tes-
tators intended that Ann should repay the $73,000 and that the account
books kept by George constituted written obligations.
A primary rule of construction of wills is to ascertain and follow the in-
tention of the testator17 as evidenced by the language of the will itself., The
court held that the wills unambiguously forgave the entire indebtedness of
Ann because she never executed a note nor owed anything to her grand-
parents. In addition the court held that the accounts kept of her father's
indebtedness could not be considered written obligations.
Capers v. Jackson"9 held that a wife had the power to convey the entire
community estate under a husband's will leaving property to the wife and
the remainder to "her heirs by me" "to manage, sell or dispose of as she may
wish or see proper." The court reasoned that a conveyance to a living per-
son's heirs indicates that the primary devisee, in this case the wife, should
have complete control over the property during her lifetime, since a living
person cannot have heirs until his death. 40
Deegan v. Frost National Bank41 construed the following provisions in a
holographic will as leaving a life estate despite the fact that life estates in
personalty are not favored in the law: "I give my sister . . .all personal
belongings such as car, jewelry . . . and cash of all nature. After the death
of my sister . I wish my entire estate . . . to go to my mother ....
Hill v. El Paso National Bank43 presented a construction question as to
36. 499 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
37. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, 1'55 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39 (1955);
Hobson v. Shelton, 302 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. See, e.g., Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1971); Rekdahl v. Long, 417
S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1967).
39. 503 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ).
40. This rationale is in harmony with the generally accepted common law view
which has been adhered to by the Supreme Court of Texas. See Templeman v. McFer-
rin, 102 Tex. 530, 120 S.W. 167 (1909).
41. 505 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd). See also Ber-
gin v. Bergin, 159 Tex. 83, 315 S.W.2d 943 (1958).
42. 505 S.W.2d at 430.
43. 511 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
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allocation of shares. The decedent provided for the distribution of his estate
as follows: Paragraph A of section 5.06 of the will provided for 30% to
go to an educational trust but not to exceed $60,000. Paragraph B provided
for 10% to go outright, and under paragraph C the "balance and remaining"
60% was allocated to designated relatives. Under section 5.11 of the will
any undistributed remainder was to go to the educational trust. The estate
was about $516,000. Thus, the 30% to be distributed in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph A would be about $155,000, and of that amount,
$60,000 would go into the educational trust. The piroblem arose concerning
the $95,000 excess over the $60,000 limit provided in paragraph A.
The attorney general contended that the $95,000 left over from paragraph
A was covered by section 5.11 and passed to the educational trust. The in-
dividual beneficiaries contended that the specific limitation of paragraph A
precluded more than $60,000 passing to the educational trust so that the
"balance" was allocated under paragraph C. The court of civil appeals sus-
tained this latter interpretation, reasoning that the enforcement of the specific
limitation of $60,000 was more in harmony with the whole scheme of the
will. 44 Although there were inconsistencies in the will provisions, the court
held that the specific dollar limitation should take precedence over other will
provisions couched in more general terms. Thus, the "balance" after cover-
ing the bequests in paragraphs A and B would include any surplus left over
from A, all of which was distributable under C.
II. TRUSTS
Removal-Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Yturri v. Yturri45 concerned the re-
moval of trustees of a testamentary trust. One of the trustees had attempted
to make a sale of property to the trust at a profit to himself. His sister, a
remainderman under the trust, discovered the transaction and because of her
protests, the transaction was not closed. The sister sought to remove her
brother, her mother, and another brother, who were co-trustees, because the
latter two by their inaction had permitted the breach of fiduciary duty by
the former. From a judgment in favor of the trustee the sister appealed.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the fact that
the trustee's plan was frustrated did not purify his actions in attempting to
profit at the expense of the trust.
Another similar case46 involved a breach of fiduciary duty by an individual
trustee who was also an officer of a bank in which the trustees had a checking
account. It has been established in Texas that a bank is liable for a trustee's
wrongful acts concerning a trust account only "if the bank has notice or
44. See McMullen v. Sims, 37 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding ap-
proved).
45. 504 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1973, no writ).
46. Texas Bank & Trust v. Helmcamp, 506 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). See also McCormick v. Hines, 503 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1973, no writ), in which plaintiffs sought removal of trustees and appoint-
ment of successors. The removal issue was determined but the succession issue was
pending when an appeal was taken. The court dismissed the appeal because the trial
court's judgment was not final.
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
knowledge that a breach of the trust is being committed by an improper with-
drawal of funds, or if it participates in the profits or fruits of the fraud
. ... ,, Following this precept, the court held that the bank was not liable
because the bank had no knowledge of the transaction, 48 derived no gains
therefrom, and had no powers to act as trustee.
Constructive Trust. A constructive trust arises in cases where one purchases
property with funds wrongfully taken from another. The trust arises in favor
of the one supplying the funds. Thus, in Searle-Taylor Machinery Co. v.
Brown Oil Tools49 Brown authorized Searle-Taylor to purchase equipment
for 'Brown and Brown supplied the money. He then authorized Searle-
Taylor to sell the equipment. Searle-Taylor did sell the equipment but made
no proper accounting of the funds. Among other things the court decreed
that a constructive trust existed on automobiles and real estate held in the
name of Searle-Taylor but purchased with funds belonging to Brown.
Estate Tax. In National Bank of Commerce v. United States"° a testator
provided in his will for a testamentary trust in which his wife had a life inter-
est and the remainder was left to charity. The trust provisions permitted the
trustee to invade corpus for the benefit of the surviving wife. The issue con-
cerned whether or not the charitable remainder could be ascertained for es-
tate tax deduction purposes. The estate contended that the power of inva-
sion required a balancing of interests between the individual life tenant and
charitable remainder so that such invasion would be governed by fiduciary
standards. However, the court construed Texas law as essentially a hands-
off policy with respect to court interference with the trustee's exercise of dis-
cretion in the absence of fraud, misconduct, or clear abuse of discretion. 5 1
Therefore, there was no way to determine how much the corpus would be
invaded and, accordingly, no way to determine the value of the remainder
passing to charity. Thus, no charitable deduction was allowed.
47. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 158, 170, 89 S.W.2d 394, 400(1935), quoting Gray v. Johnston, L.R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 1 (1868); accord, Quanah,
A. & P. Ry. v. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co., 127 Tex. 407, 412, 93 S.W.2d 701, 705(1936).
48. The court rejected the appellee's contention that notice of the misuse of funds
could be imputed to the bank because its officer had knowledge of the transaction.
Rather, the court held that notice to an officer of a bank received outside the scope of
his duties as a bank officer is not imputed to the bank. 506 S.W.2d at 669. See also
O'Brien v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 241 S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1922, writ dism'd).
49. 512 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See Marshall v. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,
no writ), in which a divorced husband was deemed constructive trustee of disability por-
tion of pension paid for with community funds. See also Dobbs v. Navarro, 506 S.W.2d
671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ); Dairy Queen v. Quinn, 502
S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), holding that oral agreement
to reconvey property violated Statute of Frauds and constructive trust could not be im-
posed. Marsh v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 488 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1974) (pension trustees
did not act in bad faith in declining disability retirement benefits).
50. 369 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Tex. .1973).
51. See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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